USAF AERIAL PORT OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM

(Aerial Port Squadron (APS) is a United States Air Force organization which operates and provides the military logistical functions assigned to aerial ports, including processing personnel and cargo, rigging for airdrop, packing parachutes, loading equipment, preparing air cargo and load plans, loading and securing aircraft, ejecting cargo for inflight delivery, and supervising units engaged in aircraft loading and unloading operations.

In the United States Air Force it may be referred to by several names including Air Mobility Support Squadron, Air Mobility Squadron, Air Terminal, Mobile Aerial Port Squadron, and others. Smaller units performing the same mission may also be called Aerial Port Flights or Aerial Port Elements. Members of these units are normally graded by the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) of 2T2X1,(formerly 605X1) Air Transportation. These "Air Transportation Specialists" tend to refer to themselves as "aerial porters," "porters," or "port dawgs." Aerial Ports are responsible for all management and movement of cargo and passengers transported in the Military Airlift System. Most Aerial Ports are divided into specific duty sections: Ramp, Cargo, Passenger Service (PAX), Air Terminal Operations Center (ATOC), Special Handling and Fleet. Of these sections, the ATOC is the nerve center. In this section all flow of cargo and passengers being handled by the Aerial Port is managed, accounted for, and tracked by the In-Transit Visibility System. Some Aerial Ports also have an aerial delivery section that rigs and maintains training loads for air drop missions. These training loads are designed to simulate cargo that is dropped to units in combat conditions by parachute over locations in
One of the most important functions performed by aerial porters is the Joint Inspection of hazardous cargo and equipment. When any customer requires the movement of these types of shipments certain requirements must be met under U.S. Department of Defense regulations. Joint Inspectors ensure that all of these requirements are met and that the shipment is safe for flight.)

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The USAF aerial port system in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was the common denominator for all in-country airlift operations. This activity's primary function was that of terminal services support. It provided support for all U.S. military airlift aircraft in RVN, including the loading and offloading of cargo and the processing and manifesting of passengers. Mobility teams were included in the organization to provide a loading and offloading capability at locations not serviced by an aerial port. They assisted in the preparation and planning of unit moves and augmented aerial ports during surge operations. The organization also had Combat Control Teams (CCTs) which could be airlanded or paradropped into forward areas to furnish ground control for airdrops, extractions, or airlanded deliveries.

The 834th Air Division was activated in October 1966 to address the myriad of management problems associated with in-country tactical airlift operations. Each of the Division's first three commanders strongly attested to the critical importance of the aerial port function. In his End-of-Tour Report dated November 1967, Brig. Gen. William G. Moore, Jr., said:

"When the intensity and magnitude of the airlift operations in terms of passengers, tonnage, and aircraft, exceed the rated capability of the aerial ports, the productiveness of each aircraft and aircrew unit decreases."


"The effectiveness of sustained tactical airlift in Vietnam is controlled to a great extent by the capability of the aerial ports to respond to shifting tactical airlift requirements.... Without adequate port facilities, equipment, and personnel to handle the widely fluctuating and
Much of the historical development of the USAF aerial port system in RVN was recorded in Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations (CHECO) reports "Assault Airlift Operations" and "Tactical Airlift Operations" published in February 1966 and June 1969, respectively. "USAF Aerial Port Operations in RVN" focuses on areas of facilities, materiel, communications, and personnel and enlarges upon major continuing problems of the aerial port program. In the words of General McLaughlin:

"A lack of adequate physical facilities, low materials handling equipment in commission rates, unreliable communications, and the shortage of personnel have been long-standing problems impacting on aerial port operations."

CHAPTER II
FIXED AERIAL PORTS AND FACILITIES

The system of USAF aerial ports in RVN on 20 July 1962 consisted of four detachments of the 7th Aerial Port Squadron (APS) located at Pleiku, Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang, and Nha Trang Air Bases. The 7th APS, with headquarters at Tachikawa AB, Japan, was a subordinate unit of the 315th Air Division, also headquartered at Tachikawa. By 1 June 1970, the aerial port system in RVN had evolved from these four original terminals to an organization including more than 30 active units operated by the 8th, 14th, and 15th APS of the 2d Aerial Port Group (APOG), a subordinate unit of the 834th Air Division. Figure 1 depicts locations of these units as of 1 June 1970.

The graphics that follows depicts locations of these units as of 1 June 1970.
In mid-1970, fixed aerial port facilities in RVN ranged from large, fully-equipped terminals at major air bases to very austere terminals at remote airfields. An example of the former was the aerial port at Cam Ranh Bay. A completely new major aerial port complex was opened at Bien Hoa on 5 January 1970. It included an air freight terminal, passenger terminal, Airlift Control Element (ALCE) building, MAC Airlift Command Post building, snack bar, latrines, outside storage area, and a 40,000-pound pit scale. Major terminals such as Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Cam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang were capable of handling more than 1,000 tons of cargo and over 3,000 passengers per day.

A number of intermediate-sized terminals, such as Chu Lai and Vung Tau, could meet workloads of 220 tons of cargo and 1,300 passengers per day. At the extreme end of the fixed port spectrum were small austere terminals at remote airfields. These facilities were constructed principally on a self-help basis to at least provide storage space and passenger protection during adverse weather conditions. Manning of such units was normally limited to less than ten
personnel, but they could be quickly augmented for heavy workloads such as large unit moves or other special mission requirements. Typical of these remote ports was Soc Trang.

Facilities problems at the aerial ports still existed in June 1970 but General Herring was able to say, "Much progress has been made in obtaining the facilities and in overcoming the problems that were an everyday part of our operation." These "everyday facilities problems" received much attention in the early development of the aerial port system.

For example, opening of the first terminal snack bar in Southeast Asia at Da Nang in early 1963 was hailed as a milestone. On 17 June 1963, the 8th APS Headquarters moved from tents to permanent structures at Tan Son Nhut, and at about the same time, it was reported the air terminal office and passenger service lounge of Detachment 4 at Nha Trang were wired and that lights had been installed. These projects were done for the most part on a self-help basis, a method of operation which became "SOP" for aerial port personnel in RVN.

The optimism and "can do" spirit of the "aerial porters" were very much in evidence during those early days. In August 1964, the newly activated detachment at Vung Tau was working out of a Conex container and tent. Windstorms flattened the tent and the cargo area was a "lake" during the rainy season. Six months later after laying pierced steel planking in the cargo area and finding office space in permanent buildings, the detachment proudly proclaimed, "We have grown considerably from the old days of tents and mud hole cargo area."

During this period of austere facilities at practically all terminals in RVN, aircraft delays chargeable to ports of the 8th APS remained remarkably low. The total number of aircraft departures from the aerial ports averaged nearly 3,500 per month during the first half of 1964, yet the delay rate chargeable to terminals never exceeded 0.2 percent, and in five of the six months did not exceed 0.1 percent.

Terminal maintenance and security were particularly pressing problems for aerial ports in RVN. In December 1964, maintenance support for the passenger terminal at Tan Son Nhut was termed "not adequate." USAF civil engineers disclaimed responsibility since the building was a VNAF facility constructed under MAP funding. VNAF engineers were likewise reluctant to maintain the facility since it was operated by the 8th Aerial Port Squadron. Finally, responsibility for latrine maintenance was assigned USAF engineers and VNAF personnel were to provide needed maintenance for the rest of the facility. This arrangement did not solve the
problem since VNAF engineers did not possess U.S. replacement materials or parts with which the building was primarily equipped, or qualified personnel to perform the maintenance. In June 1965, latrine maintenance was being performed at the Tan Son Nhut terminal by USAF engineers and remaining terminal maintenance was being performed by 8th APS personnel on a do-it-yourself basis. Many of these problems disappeared as the aerial port operation in RVN matured, however, problems with latrine maintenance persisted at nearly all aerial ports. As late as 22 May 1970, it was considered by the detachment commander at Nha Trang to be the major obstacle to providing professional caliber passenger service at that terminal.

Security for passengers and cargo presented a continuing challenge for aerial porters. On 26 June 1964 at Tan Son Nhut, a bomb exploded about 20 feet from 55 Special Force passengers and about 60 feet from a C-135 which was to airlift this unit back to the United States. Three men were injured slightly and no other damage or injuries was reported. An Air Vietnam baggage handler admitted that he was to have placed the bomb on the aircraft but could not do so without being observed. Three other Vietnamese had been bribed to overlook anything they observed that might seem "suspicious." Aerial port shift chiefs performed daily periodic inspections of terminal premises checking on abandoned baggage, foot-lockers, boxes, and satchels that could not be readily associated with an owner. Such items were immediately brought to the attention of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel for clearance. Intensive security measures continued and in June 1970 nearly all baggage at major terminals was thoroughly checked for explosives before being loaded aboard 834th AD aircraft. Quality control personnel at Tan Son Nhut inspected each pallet of cargo immediately prior to loading to insure that loads had not been tampered with in any way. The sighting of unauthorized personnel in the proximity of aircraft was sufficient reason for offloading and searching the aircraft.

Problems in protecting cargo were a continuing facet of aerial port life as indicated by an incident at Nha Trang on 18 May 1970. A Vietnamese Marine unit was moving through the port and these men, along with their equipment, were in the cargo holding area which was neither adequately fenced nor illuminated. Normally, port personnel were able to keep the area under close surveillance. However, several aircraft came in between 2100 and 2300 hours and required all the reduced night force to help with their servicing. For a short time, the cargo holding area was unattended. When port personnel returned to the area, they found several pallets had been pilfered, and 75 to 80 cases of canned fish, several cases of medical supplies, and one bag of U.S. letter mail were missing. A general search of the unit's equipment by
Vietnamese and American security personnel recovered some of the fish, most of the medical supplies, and the mail. The person taking the mail had apparently wanted only the bright red mail sack for his personal gear. This affair appointed the need for more fencing and better lighting, a need which characterized many of the aerial ports throughout RVN.

Congested and poorly located facilities plagued the aerial ports in RVN. Brig. Gen. William G. Moore, Jr., first Commander, 834th Air Division, described this serious problem on 26 January 1967:

"Cargo processing areas in which our aerial ports must operate have few hard surfaced areas. Palletization and handling are being accomplished in the mud or on the aircraft parking ramps. The aerial port mission is further hampered by the lack of adequate covered storage areas to protect freight during processing. For example, at Tan Son Nhut over 50 percent of the cargo open processing is in mud. In the passenger area, we are processing personnel in the most inadequate facilities imaginable. During December 1966, the aerial ports processed over 400,000 passengers utilizing Conex containers, tents, and small crowded buildings at terminal facilities. Another factor that detracts from our aerial port capability is the congested ramp areas on which we work. Many of our stations are so crowded with other tactical missions that our airlift aircraft must wait for a chance to park or even circle awaiting ramp space at some of our smaller strips. At other bases we are processing cargo in as many as three separate areas in order to obtain room handle all the port requirements. All of these factors contribute to excessive turnaround times and their impact on aircraft utilization is a matter of primary concern to me. Delays are being reduced but not at the rate we would like to see."

As was expected in such a fluid tactical situation, nearly all problems concerning port facilities were destined to persist in some degree throughout the war. However, significant gains were constantly being made at the major ports. For example, in June 1968, an entire aerial port complex, consisting of 8,000 square feet (SF) of covered cargo area, 90,000 SF of open cargo area, and an 8,000-SF passenger terminal, was well on its way to completion at Da Nang. In addition, a 4,500-SF passenger terminal at Nha Trang was nearing completion; 50,000 SF of open cargo area was being added to the existing area at Phu Cat; paving of 20,000 SF of open cargo area was progressing at Pleiku; and paving of the 32,000-SF Army air cargo area at Tan Son Nhut was almost completed. Despite such gains, General McLaughlin, in reviewing the
entire port system in June 1969 commented, "Many passenger terminals are grossly inadequate, storage areas are cramped and often poorly located."

General Moore in commenting on "congested ramp areas," and General McLaughlin on "cramped and poorly located storage areas," were pointing up a most important lesson learned and one which could largely be precluded in future contingencies with proper planning. That lesson was the need to include sufficient and properly located real estate for aerial port complexes in the planning of air bases. General Herring said, "Adequate space at the right locations has been our big problem, not the cost of most facilities."

The "largest and foremost" problem facing the Air Freight Section at Tan Son Nhut in June 1966 was one of space. The unit's originally assigned real estate was reduced by 25 percent, while its workload was increased by 50 percent. Added to this was the handicap of having to operate from three separate cargo handling locations. Congested and poorly located storage and loading areas could not be attributed solely to the fact that USAF aerial ports had to take the space that was available at established airfields such as Tan Son Nhut. The situation was not much better at Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang, both of which were planned and constructed by U.S. forces. At Cam Ranh Bay, cargo had to be hauled as much as one and a half miles between the port area and parked aircraft. At Phan Rang, more than a nine-mile round trip by flat-bed trailer between port facilities and aircraft loading/offloading points was a routine part of the cargo handling operation when the aerial port was located in the Buu Son area of the base. As Col. Robert A. Vrilakas, Vice Commander, 2d APOG said:

"We can expect a buildup period in aerial port operations in future contingency operations. It is safe to assume that our effort will be an expanding one at nearly all major and intermediate ports. Why not initially dedicate sufficient and properly located real estate to the port complexes that we can surely expect to be eventually required?"

This matter received attention at the First Annual Tactical Airlift Symposium. A Symposium Panel agreed that:

"History of airlift operations has proved that aerial ports rarely are afforded adequate real estate to sufficiently accomplish the assigned mission when deployed in support of contingency operations/exercises .... Additional requirements for real estate and structural facilities are not normally made available to the aerial port without considerable realignment"
The panel went on to point out that vital cargo handling equipment should not be obligated to moving cargo over great distances from ramps to holding areas, since it then became a decisive factor in determining the timely movement of airlift in and out of a given site. It was unanimously agreed that "port" operations should be located as near the parking ramp as possible and that appropriate recognition be given to the allocation of space and structures for aerial port operations when deployed to a base where allocation of space was not pre-determined. The panel recommended that "planning factors be developed and published that will facilitate the allocation of real estate for aerial port use." If the panel's recommendation was a prelude of definitive action to follow, then one of the most difficult and trying lessons learned in RVN with respect to aerial port facilities would not have to be learned again in future contingency operations.

CHAPTER III
MATERIEL

The lifeblood of the aerial ports in RVN was the 463L Materials Handling Support System. This system of five "families" of equipment was designed for worldwide deployment to "provide a complete materials handling system compatible with all modes of transportation required to accomplish the Department of Defense logistics and aerial delivery system." The 463L Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) was introduced in RVN in 1964 and was thereafter plagued with two major recurring problems: poor in-commission rates and shortages of pallets and restraint equipment.

Materials Handling Equipment
The MHE vehicles of greatest concern to the aerial ports were the various forklifts and K-loaders. The critically important role played by these vehicles in airlift operations was pointed up by General Moore on 10 January 1967:

"Our greatest limitation in the airlift system now is the lack of MHE, that is, the equipment that the aerial port must have to palletize loads and to load the pallets on and off aircraft. Right now we are operating with approximately 39 percent of the forklifts which we need to do our job and some 42 percent of the K-loaders which we need to do our job today. The problem has been highlighted all the way up through the AF system and is getting expedited
and emergency attention at this time. With additional ground handling equipment and the parts support to Keep the equipment operating, we believe we can increase our tonnage anywhere from 10 to 21 percent without any increase in the numbers of aircraft assigned to us. The MHE which we have was not designed for continuous operation or for operation in the environment of dirt, sand, and mud in which we now operate the equipment at many of our isolated and dirt airstrips."

General Moore's efforts significantly increased the number of pieces of MHE in RVN. In November 1966, he had 423 pieces authorized with 279 assigned. A year later, 442 pieces were authorized and 418 were on hand. The in-commission rate had also improved significantly due to better spare parts support, establishment of a component rebuild program at Clark AB, Philippines, and visits in-country by AFLC 463L maintenance teams. General Moore believed the experiences with MHE in RVN provided valuable lessons which should be used as a guide in developing future MHE and the programming of maintenance and supply support of this vital equipment. He emphasized that experience factors based on "Stateside" development programs were not always compatible with the kind of continuous and tortuous operation to which his MHE was subjected in RVN.

In June 1969, General McLaughlin was finding shortages of authorized MHE remained a major constraint on aerial port operations. According to the General at that time: "Although this situation has improved considerably, we are still short nine K-loaders and 59 fork-lifts, our most critically needed items." Commenting on experience factors for MHE, he sounded the same note as had General Moore:

"The replacement cycle for MHE is unrealistic for this combat environment. For example, under normal operating conditions the life expectancy of a forklift is eight years. That standard cannot be achieved here, given the conditions that exist. The excessively high operating times, often on unprepared surfaces, cause severe wear and tear on hydraulic systems, transmissions, and axles. The operation of forklifts in dust, mud, and sand, over rocks and PSP, and in heavy rains, necessarily has a debilitating effect on vehicle systems. These factors shorten the useful life of MHE in Vietnam by 50 percent. More realistic formulas should be developed for replacing MHE committed to a combat environment. Equipment must be phased through the various replacement codes at a faster rate, with replacement of forklifts programmed for the fourth instead of the eighth year."
“Happy Valley” Phan Rang AB, Vietnam
...keeping the memories alive

Phan Rang AB News No. 132

“Stories worth telling”
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“Stories worth telling”
General McLaughlin called for expedited delivery of mission essential equipment to fill valid authorizations. He noted that many MHE authorizations were developed only after experience in the field revealed a shortage of such equipment and that deliveries of equipment normally followed authorizations by 9 to 18 months.

An encouraging exception to this "normal" time sequence for obtaining equipment to fill authorizations occurred in early 1970. Col. Howard E. Bettis, Commander, 2d APOG, attended the Seventh PACAF Vehicle Support Conference which convened on 14 January at WRAMA, Robins AFB, Georgia. As a result of his presentation of the critical need for MHE to fill initial shortages of 1OK Adverse Terrain (AT) forklifts, 16 of those vehicles were airlifted to RVN by 21 April. They arrived in RVN in time to provide "indispensable" support for the Cambodian operations in May 1970. The 1OK(AT) forklift introduced in RVN in 1968 represented one of the most significant developments of the war so far as MHE was concerned. This modified version of a front end scoop loader designed and manufactured by Euclid Division of General Motors Corporation quickly won the approval and praise of aerial port personnel for its ruggedness and reliability. They were used at all aerial port detachments and operating locations, and were deployed on mobility operations throughout RVN where swampland, sand, and mud were the rule, not the exception. The diesel powered 1OK(AT) proved to be far superior in every respect to its forerunner, the 1OK Rough Terrain (RT) forklift.

General McLaughlin believed the 1OK(AT) forklift represented a valuable lesson learned and suggested exploring the possibility of diesel power for all MHE. In April 1970, this idea seemed to be gaining favor when it was announced that economics of conversion of 40K-loaders to diesel power was being studied by AFLC, and that first production delivery of new diesel 40K-loaders was expected in May 1971.

MHE operating in RVN was vulnerable to combat damage. Ground fire and shell fragments took a heavy toll of tires, hydraulic lines, and radiators. On numerous occasions, forklifts were inoperable solely because of blown tires. General McLaughlin's staff developed Southeast Asia Operational Requirement (SEAOR) 174 in 1968 calling for battle-damage-proof tires. On 30 May 1970, Col. Victor Lisec, Commander, 8th APS, expressed concern because battle-damage-proof tires had not been received in RVN; he cited experiences during the first month of the Cambodian operation which displayed, the need for such tires. In the first month of that action, 1 10K(AT) forklifts required 24 tire changes. Cost of replacement tires was $4,853.04, and a total of 408.5 hours of MHE out-of-commission time was experienced. A total of 33,600
pounds of airlift costing $6,782.00 was required to transport tires to forward operating locations and return unserviceable tires for breakdown.

The first ten sets of battle-damage-proof tires were received in RVN on 3 June 1970. They were installed the same day on 10K(AT) fork-lifts and 25K-loaders at Tan Son Nhut, Cam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang, ready for deployment to the field. The development of battle-damage-proof tires, coupled with recommendations coming from the First Annual Tactical Airlift Symposium, gave promise that future MHE would be better suited for deployment to combat zones than had been the MHE in RVN.

A panel of the Symposium recommended that protection kits for MHE should be provided which could be installed in two hours or less by one man. Such kits were to protect radiators, hydraulic systems, fuel lines and tanks, tires, and the operator's position from battle damage.

In June 1970, General Herring was looking first to the past and then to the future when he said:

"We have used 463L MHE to satisfy requirements never envisioned by its designers. What we need to do now is develop equipment to meet the kinds of requirements we have discovered in RVN and which we may expect in future contingencies .... In the development of new airlift aircraft, related MHE and cargo handling procedures should be part of the package."

The general further suggested that some attention might profitably be devoted to compatibility between Army and Air Force MHE. He pointed out that Army helicopter pads usually adjoined runways at forward airlift airfields, but that considerable time and effort were expended in transferring cargo from one airlift system to the other. It was his belief that the need for increased compatibility between Army and Air Force cargo handling systems warranted further study.

MHE Maintenance
No more important lesson was learned in RVN with respect to aerial port operations than the one having to do with maintenance of MHE. It was clearly evident that transportation squadrons did not usually have sufficient manning in the skills required to maintain the equipment properly. During 1968, the manning of in-country 463L maintenance shops varied from one mechanic per 18 vehicle equivalents to one per 30 vehicle equivalents; PACAF-desired manning was one mechanic per 14.5 vehicle equivalents. In a letter to 7AF(DM) on 22 March
1968, the Commander, 834th AD, solicited "urgent command assistance in developing a compatible degree of support for MHE and the 463L system in Vietnam."

He pointed out that the average in-commission rates for forklifts and K-loaders for the six-month period ending 29 February 1968 were 66 and 72 percent, respectively, as opposed to the PACAF standard of 92 percent. Vehicle-deadlined-for-parts (VDP) rates of 13 and 9 percent and vehicle-deadlined-for maintenance (VDM) rates of 20 and 19 percent for forklifts and K-loaders, respectively, were having "a direct effect on operational rates." The factor which kept MHE in-commission rates from falling and remaining at disastrously low levels was the insertion of AFLC and PACAF maintenance teams periodically on a TDY basis. These teams were of invaluable help and relieved, temporarily at least, dangerously low in-commission rates.

This kind of "maintenance brinksmanship" convinced men of the aerial ports that an organically assigned maintenance capability offered promising solution to this serious problem. General McLaughlin believed that such action would provide port commanders with the necessary capability and flexibility to respond to maintenance contingencies. On 6 October 1969, Col. Robert J. Sunde, Commander, 2d APOG, took the same stand, pointing out that "each time the situation has become a problem, it has been because the local maintenance force was not adequate to support our equipment." He also advanced the premise that an organic maintenance force for the aerial ports would improve the situation.

This position was gaining support in other quarters as evidenced by panel recommendations at the First Annual Tactical Airlift Symposium. A panel concluded that placement of maintenance manpower and tool authorizations within host base vehicle maintenance organizations had proved highly unsatisfactory, particularly when MHE equipment was deployed. It recommended that "immediate organizational action be taken to provide all aerial port units with organically assigned 463L maintenance authorizations." No matter what type of maintenance organization was to evolve, aerial port personnel were unanimous in their belief that special identifiers should be developed for 463L mechanics to avoid dilution of this vital resource in the AF pool of "general vehicle" mechanics.

463L Pallets
The 463L pallets were absolutely essential to rapid and efficient handling of cargo. They permitted preparation of cargo for airlift prior to arrival of aircraft and the processing of terminating cargo after aircraft departure. Their use, obviated the need for laborious and time-
consuming "floor loading" and tiedown. By using 463L pallets, a C-130 could be completely offloaded and reloaded in 15 minutes. This ability to offload rapidly was of overriding importance when cargo was delivered to forward airfields in high-threat areas. However, it was in such operations that an appallingly high loss rate of pallets and restraint equipment occurred. At times, losses of these assets had a severe impact on airlift capability.

These losses occurred principally at the more than 100 airlift airfields which did not have permanent aerial port representation. Cargo was delivered to these locations on pallets with the understanding that users would remove it and leave the pallets for later recovery by aerial port mobility teams and 834th AD aircraft. All too often, the pallets were diverted to other uses by military forces or local nationals. Pallets offered excellent construction material for bunkers, bridges, driveways, tent floors, and shelters of all designs.

A concerted pallet recovery program was initiated in late 1968 involving the combined efforts of the 834th AD Airlift Control Center, aerial port mobility teams, aircrew members, and Army airfield personnel. A MACV directive established policy, responsibilities, and procedures for the control, recovery, and return of 463L pallets and restraint equipment to the MACV Common Service Airlift System. The directive was applicable to all MACV staff agencies and subordinate commands. The first Annual Tactical Airlift Symposium noted the MACV directive and recommended that a joint service directive be prepared establishing service responsibilities and guidance for assuring positive control of 463L pallets and restraint equipment in a theater of operations.

Progress in pallet recovery was indicated during the first four months of 1970 when record numbers of pallets and restraint equipment valued at $3,152,353.00 were recovered from airfields not having permanently assigned aerial port units. Apart from monetary considerations, General Herring commented, "Pallet recovery is worth our every effort since they give the airlift system so much capability. The problem must receive our concerted and continued attention."

**Weighing Equipment**

A continuing deficiency in weighing capability harassed aerial ports in RVN for years. Such capability was needed throughout the port system so that aircraft could be safely loaded. It was considered particularly important that some capability for accurate weight determination be provided mobility teams operating at austere forward airfields. In June 1967, General Moore
"When an Army unit moves from one field location to another, there is no way of accurately determining the weight of much of the cargo and rolling stock that must be airlifted. The contents of locked Conex containers, for example, cannot be verified. Nor can the accurate weight of a mud-laden truck full of foot lockers and tool kits be accurately estimated. In certain cases, this creates an aircraft safety problem due to possible overgrossing. Continual stress should be made to obtain an adequate portable weighing capability."

The continual stress called for by General Moore took the forms of SEAORs 82 and 102 and brought portable weighing equipment to RVN. In August 1968, the Mobile Electronic Weighing System (MEWS) was introduced. This was a self-contained, self-powered, mobile weighing unit designed to operate under austere conditions. Each trailer unit was air transportable and could be palletized on a single 463L pallet. The system could supposedly weigh any type of airlift cargo. On 1 June 1970, ten of these units were on hand in RVN and four were in commission. Calibration and spare parts had proved to be problems and avionics personnel were not fully qualified to perform necessary maintenance.

Another device made available to the aerial ports was an off-the-shelf item, the Martin-Decker hydraulic lift-truck weight indicator. Those units began arriving in June 1969 and were installed on 10K(RT) and 10K standard forklifts. This device proved very effective under testing at Pope AFB but met with marginal success in RVN. Aerial port forklift operators found it confusing to operate and despite extensive training programs, they lacked confidence in weight information obtained with it. More importantly, the 10K(AT) Euclid forklift, which came into use on practically all mobility operations, had no integral weighing capability. However, testing in early 1970 at the Tactical Airlift Center, Pope AFB, indicated that a Martin-Decker hydraulic weight indicator could be successfully adapted for use with the 10K(AT) forklift. If this proved to be correct, the problem defined by General Moore in June 1967 was nearing solution in June 1970.

Calibration and maintenance of other aerial port weighing equipment also presented continuing problems. The 13 MA-1 vehicle weighing kits in RVN were used to weigh all types of cargo at all kinds of locations. However, these kits were easily damaged in the field and had to be returned to CONUS for repair at depots. Pipeline time was long since these heavy instruments were usually shipped by sea transport. On 1 June 1970, only 5 of the 13 MA-1 kits in RVN were in commission.
At the same time, two of the six 60,000-pound capacity pit scales in RVN were in commission. Calibration was the chief difficulty and could be performed only by Fairbanks Morse personnel from the United States. Obtaining this service was a time-consuming process. A field engineer was expected in RVN on 22 June 1970 in response to a requirement established in late 1969.

Twenty-five of the twenty-three-pound-capacity, low-profile scales in RVN were in commission on 15 June 1970. Many of these scales were new and had arrived during the previous three months, however, calibration problems were anticipated. No serious problems with baggage scales had developed, probably because these were the only weighing devices in the aerial port inventory that PMEL personnel were authorized to maintain. This fact in itself possibly represented a valuable lesson learned.

Aerial port personnel managed to keep the cargo safely moving in RVN with the weighing equipment that was available and with weight estimates. Some aircraft overloading occurred on rare occasions, however, estimated weights were most likely to have been on the "heavy" side. Maj. Ralph C. Alexandre, Director, Materiel, 2d APOG, said, "We will never be able to determine the amount of airlift wasted in RVN due to non-availability of accurate cargo weight information." In June 1970, he considered maintenance of weighing equipment to rank with pallet recovery as the chief problems of aerial ports, with no satisfactory solution in sight.

CHAPTER IV
PORT COMMUNICATIONS

The problem of communications at a remote aerial port detachment was generally similar to the situation described in this report from Phuoc Vinh in June 1966:

"The greatest problem since activation, with no improvement to date, is the communications system. It is extremely difficult and time-consuming to communicate with other locations, except within the 1st Division area and except by mail .... No realistic 'get well' date can be foreseen."

The prediction of a delayed "get well" date stated in the Phuoc Vinh report was all too correct. In June 1969, General McLaughlin in commenting on the lack of adequate communications between port locations said, "We are now forced to rely solely on nondedicated land line communications which are completely unsatisfactory." The general believed this lack of
adequate communications was causing considerable waste of valuable airlift because essential traffic information from outlying users could not be coordinated on a timely basis.

It was impossible for aerial port units to apprise down-line I stations as to aircraft loads so they could preplan passengers and cargo for these scheduled flights. Land lines were not available throughout the port system, and where they were available, a telephone call could take hours to complete. ALCE communications were not available in many locations and aircraft movement information took precedence over traffic information. This situation resulted in two options: increased ground time or denial of available cargo load. The result of either option was an inflated investment in airframes to accomplish the airlift mission.

In late 1969, installation of 37 high frequency single side band (HF/SSB) radio sets was in progress throughout the aerial port system in RVN. This HF/SSB network, under auspices of local communications squadrons, consisted of four segments. Each of the three aerial port squadrons possessed a net connecting nearly all of the squadron's detachments and operating locations on an assigned dedicated frequency. A fourth net connected the three squadrons with the 2d APOG Headquarters at Tan Son Nhut on still another assigned dedicated frequency. This system was 93 percent operational on 1 June 1970.

The long wait for an acceptable aerial port communications system convinced many port personnel that a communications capability should be organic to its organization. The First Annual Tactical Airlift Symposium was also on record as recommending the authorization of HF/SSB radio equipment as part of the in-house communications for aerial ports.

An even more exciting development was expected to be implemented during the summer of 1970. This was the Airlift Management System (ALMS), a computerized aircraft scheduling system. A part of its capability was expected to be of great benefit to the aerial ports. The ports were to submit their cargo backlogs daily to the ALMS computer and, in turn, receive a fragmentary order covering the next day's missions. The order was to identify the amount and type of cargo scheduled to move from each port, as well as the cargo to be received. This system held great promise for aerial ports and in June 1970, the extent to which it could be exploited remained to be seen.
CHAPTER V
MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

The formidable problems with facilities, materiel, and communications mentioned in the previous chapters would have taxed severely a properly manned and highly experienced aerial port force. The assigned strength of aerial port units consistently lagged behind authorizations and the lack of transportation personnel resources in the CONUS necessitated heavy augmentation of the force with cross-trainees. In light of this situation, the achievements by aerial ports in RVN were all the more remarkable.

Civilianization of CONUS aerial ports led to the lack of trained and experienced port personnel. To meet the demand, NCOs and airmen were transferred from other career fields to SEA authorizations. In many cases, these personnel received only a brief two-week course in aircraft cargo loading prior to their arrival in RVN and some of their attitudes reflected less than high motivation. Some of these men were in the later years of their military careers, and found no incentive to remain in a career field which offered limited promotional opportunities and for which they were so unprepared. However, the overall high caliber of assigned personnel was the reason for success of the aerial port mission despite extremely heavy workloads, inadequate facilities, equipment, manning, and supplies. Extremely heavy work-loads were commonplace and the following report from Nha Trang in 1965 was typical of aerial port activities throughout RVN:

"The Detachment experienced a marked increase in workload during the reporting period. The greatest increase occurred during the period 1 April to 30 June. It should be noted that the 94 percent increase in cargo processed and 44 percent increase in passengers processed was not accompanied by any manpower increase."

From the detachment at Qui Nhon came a similar report:

"The Detachment lost 4 enlisted men without replacements during May and June (1965). The Detachment is at present down to nine enlisted personnel and one officer with an increase in tonnage from 862.8 tons for May to 2,501.8 tons in June 1965."

Aerial ports suffered chronically from a lack of sufficient authorized and assigned personnel. In November 1966, 2,101 personnel were authorized to handle aerial port functions in RVN. By
November 1967, this authorization had increased to 2,498 and manning had risen from 83 percent to 98 percent of authorized strength. However, when compared with PACAF manpower standards, the aerial ports in RVN were short 514 authorizations in late 1967.

The lack of qualified personnel was still sapping capabilities of the aerial ports in 1967 and generated the need for an extensive training program in RVN to upgrade or cross-train inexperienced personnel. In January 1967, 88.8 percent of all aerial port personnel were in upgrade or retraining status. Of all personnel assigned, 57.2 percent were retraining from either supply or administrative career fields into the transportation field. Further, 21.4 percent were in upgrade training in their primary career fields and only 11.2 percent of aerial port personnel were qualified in grade. By November 1967, significant progress had been made and the training program was reduced to 62 percent of assigned personnel. Importantly, only 8.6 percent were in cross-training, while the remainder were in upgrade training in their primary field. Serious personnel problems remained, however, and manning was so critical during the 1968 TET offensive that assistance from out-of-theater resources had to be employed. Approximately 400 TDY personnel from USAFE, PACAF, and CONUS augmented the aerial ports in RVN until May 1968.

By June 1970, serious shortages in authorization and manning, as well as in trained personnel, seemed to be a feature of the past. With the phasing down of the war in RVN, commanders had time to provide training programs designed to refine and polish skills as opposed to having to teach them from first principles. In April 1970, the 14th APS at Cam Ranh Bay was able to initiate classes each day for MHE operators. Prior to that time, personnel could not be spared "off the line" for that kind of individual instruction. MHE operators at Cam Ranh Bay were preparing for a "463L Rodeo" which would determine select crews to service C-5A aircraft, expected there later in the summer. Nearly all manpower and personnel problems throughout the aerial port system in 1970 related to 463L/MHE maintenance which was discussed in Chapter III.

Actions were recommended at the First Annual Tactical Airlift Symposium to improve the present and foreseeable future aerial port manning situation. One of these recommendations was that future aerial port cross-trainees be permanently identified as such by the placement of an identifier on their AFSC or the awarding of a special experience identity code. According to a symposium panel, "This would enable the individual to work in his primary functional area during CONUS assignments and still be available for aerial port use in overseas areas in a PCS
status or when otherwise required to meet tactical situations." Another symposium recommendation was that aerial port reserve units be authorized and manned, but not be tied to a parent reserve airlift unit. Such units would insure the availability of aerial port personnel for call up independently of flying units when the situation warranted.

CHAPTER VI
MOBILITY OPERATIONS

The emblem of the 2d Aerial Port Group contained the figure of a "minuteman" of the American Revolutionary War, signifying the readiness of aerial port personnel to take the field at a minute's notice. It was the opinion of Col. Howard E. Bettis, Commander, 2d APOG, that an equally appropriate name for aerial port personnel was that of "middle-men" since they served as the link between airlift aircraft and the customers, or users. No better example of the readiness of minutemen and the position of middlemen was found in RVN aerial port operations than the mobility teams.

Approximately 100 airlift airfields in RVN did not require an aerial port facility on a sustained basis. When a sizable tactical airlift operation developed at one of these airfields, an Aerial Port Mobility Team was deployed to support the effort. This activity was included in that part of the aerial port mission which called for Operation of mobile terminals. Col. Victor Lisec, commander, 8th APS, said, "A mobile terminal in RVN amounts to a six-man mobility team and a 1OK(AT) forklift." These six men, operating in a most austere and hazardous environment, were expected to perform nearly all the functions of an established fixed aerial port.

Mobility teams normally consisted of a loadmaster and five air freight specialists. In Colonel Lisec's squadron, all mobility team personnel were volunteers, however, each of the three Aerial Port Squadrons developed individual organizations and methods of operation. Some mobility personnel believed a single mobility unit for the Group, rather than three squadron units, would have resulted in a smoother and more responsive operation.

The teams traveled "light," taking only enough equipment and rations to sustain operations for five days. This practice was found best in view of restricted airlift available to teams, relatively / brief deployments, and required security for team gear.
Mobility team assignments included helping users plan unit moves, marshaling loads, loading and offloading aircraft, and pallet recovery missions. An example of assistance with unit moves was Operation LOCUST GREEN in 1968. Elements of the 101st Airborne Division were relocated from their Phuoc Vinh base camp to Dak To to help disperse a concentration of hostile forces operating in that area. Mobility teams from the 8th APS and 15th APS participated in the movement; they handled 1,520 tons of cargo and 5,768 passengers. In Operation DELAWARE-LAMSON, conducted in the A Shau Valley in 1968, a mobility team moved 3,088 tons of cargo and 600 passengers, and remained throughout the operation to redeploy the forces upon its termination. It was reported that this mobility operation was performed under conditions of "high risk and extreme austerity." Such conditions were the norm for mobility teams and their many acts of heroism under hostile fire placed them among the most highly decorated personnel of the 834th Air Division.

Quite often, mobility teams remained in the field overnight and found shelter wherever they could, usually in compounds and bunkers near forward airfields. When this happened, they were expected to take regular turns at guard duty. Mobility team members were called upon to man M-60 machine guns, trigger Claymore mines, operate communications, build bunkers, and stretch wire. An Air Freight Specialist with only M-16 training could find himself atop a bunker manning an Army crew-served weapon in the midst of a sapper attack. These personnel proved to be apt pupils and of necessity quickly mastered such weapons; however, such incidents pointed up the need for more and better training of all mobility team personnel before deployment in a combat situation.

The Cambodian operation in May 1970 was heavily supported by mobility teams from all three RVN Aerial Port Squadrons. Some loaded hundreds of tons of ammunition aboard 834th AD aircraft, while others handled cargo for the 1st Air Cavalry Division, one of the first combat units to move into enemy sanctuaries. Still others deployed to numerous airfields along the border to offload aircraft. These fields ranged from Djamap down to Moc Hoa in the Parrot's Beak. Mobility teams moved 16,000 tons of cargo in May 1970. This accomplishment compared with the 25,000 tons of cargo normally handled each month by the 8th APS at Tan Son Nhut.

Events in RVN had shown that mobility operations were smoothest when teams were experienced and well trained. Here again aerial port personnel were hoping that men with combat mobility team experience would be identified in the event they were needed in future.
contingencies. This identification and the need for more intensive training for this highly specialized task were the primary concerns of aerial port mobility personnel in June 1970.

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY

The aerial ports in RVN were a vital part of the largest and most complex sustained tactical airlift operation in history. The air transportation of men and materiel was statistically staggering. For example, in 1969 the 934th Air Division airlifted more than 4.5 million passengers, the equivalent of the combined populations of Boston, Detroit, Cincinnati, Dallas, Oklahoma City, Omaha, and Honolulu. The 1969 total weight of cargo, mail, and passengers airlifted in RVN was more than 1,341,000 tons.

These figures have to be doubled to gain a realistic indication of the magnitude of the task performed by the aerial ports. A ton of airlifted cargo was usually handled two times by aerial port personnel, once during loading and again during offloading. The same held true in the processing of passengers aboard as well as off aircraft. The accomplishments of the ports were all the more remarkable in light of the problems described in this report.

Emphasizing the critically important role played by aerial ports in tactical airlift, General Herring said:

"As we look beyond the operation in RVN, we should guard against a tendency demonstrated in the past to draw down heavily on aspects of the airlift system that are not constantly exercised in peacetime such as the aerial port function. If we are going to maintain "x" amount of tactical airlift capability, then we need to determine and maintain a corresponding minimum amount of aerial port strength. That minimum account should be based on a capability to expand rapidly."

It was General Herring’s belief that some actively maintained aerial port organization oriented toward tactical airlift would be necessary if progress based on experiences in RVN were to be achieved. The kind of active, progressive aerial port nucleus capable of rapid expansion envisioned by General Herring addressed a need voiced by Col. R. M. Chapman at the First Annual Tactical Airlift Symposium. He said, "In the future, we must have an aerial port organization in being complete with trained personnel and materials handling equipment. Ready for deployment...."
Important lessons had been learned with respect to facilities, material, communications, and personnel during the RVN airlift operation. Whether these lessons learned would be capitalized upon to preclude the long and costly buildup of aerial port operations in future contingencies was a question that in June 1970 was yet to be answered.

**Det 8, 14th Aerial Port Squadron facilities in the Buu Son Area.**  
**New Aerial Port facilities with a separate building for the freight and passenger terminal and ALCE and administration building.**

(As an Aerial Porter myself, my first involvement with the Vietnam war was in 1964 during and after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. I was stationed at Clark AB, Pl. assigned to the 1506 Support Squadron (MATS). President Johnson was quick to expand support for the Vietnam War and during approximately a two week period our squadron loaded 500 lb bombs on C-130 aircraft with an aircraft departing every hour. Everyone in the port, including the Chief, helped load these aircraft, one right after the other. Bombs arrived on a 40 ft. flat bed and all we did is roll them on the aircraft floor and then chain them down, an operation that took longer than loading them. It was a herculean event that we accomplished without a single delay or incident. During that period of time, morale was very high and we could probably have accomplished anything. After Clark I was assigned to Travis AFB, Ca., still supporting the Vietnam War in various capacities while assigned to the 60th APS and the 22nd AF before finally being assigned to Phan Rang AB. When I first arrived at Phan Rang our aerial port facilities were pretty much like the primitive facilities discussed in the article. Our operation was in the Buu Son area of Phan Rang near the civilian air terminal. Our ramp was PSP and all of the buildings, including the passenger terminal, ALCE and Load planning were lined up along the ramp. Cargo processing and storage took place out in the open on the ramp and as stated in the article we had to transport all of our cargo to the C-123 parking area on 40 ft. flat beds, a 9 mile round trip. Transiting aircraft taxied to our area for servicing and also originating flights that carried
explosives also taxied to our area to pick up their load because we had a small ammo dump right beside the ramp to hold transiting munitions and fuel bladders. The buildings did resemble something that would have been built by self-help, but I don’t really know, except the small Load Planning and Records building was more substantial and I suspect that it was a manufactured building. All of that changed when we moved to our new modern facilities sometime mid 1968. My next tour of duty was at McChord AFB, WA, still supporting the Vietnam War while working in the aerial port. Phan Rang Newsletter 29 had a pictorial on Det. 8, 14th Aerial Port Squadron and newsletter 60 had an organizational profile of that organization.


Cam Ranh Gives Viet War a Big Lift - Lifeline for Allied Forces

(Pacific Stars & Stripes, Friday, July 21, 1967)

By JOE MCDANIEL
S&S Staff Correspondent
CAM RANH BAY, Vietnam- Military airlift is a key element in the operation of the war in Vietnam, and nowhere is that being proven more than here at the sprawling air base at Cam Ranh Bay.

Strategically located about midway up the coast of South Vietnam, Cam Ranh Bay's vast stretches of open space and relative security offer a perfect location for the arrival of cargo
As in all other phases of military operations, different organizations and services work together to achieve a common goal, that of keeping the fighting men supplied with every necessary item.

While many military services have an airlift capability, and all of them use military aircraft, the function in Vietnam is primarily associated with the Military Airlift Command (MAC) located at Scott Air Force Base, Ill., and the 834th Air Division at Tan Son Nhut.

The beginning of the long supply trail may be at Robins, Dover, McGuire or Charleston Air Force Bases on the east coast of the United States or Travis and McChord Air Force Bases on the west coast.

There giant C124 Globemasters, C133 Cargo Masters, C141 Starlifters, or the smaller C97 Strato Freighters, C-121 Super Constellations and C130 Hercules load their cargos of ammunition, food, vehicles and other supplies and start their long journey to Vietnam.

Also in the long shuttle are MAC civilian contract aircraft. Beginning April 1, 1966, Pan American was the first civilian contract airline to fly into Vietnam. Since then 16 commercial companies have been actively engaged in ferrying cargo into the country.

At the present time military and civilian aircraft split about half-and-half on the number of cargo flights into Cam Ranh Bay. Both average approximately 500 landings each month. During the last three months they have averaged over 8,500 tons of cargo delivered from the United States.

Responsible for the MAC and civilian aircraft are support personnel of the 608th Military Airlift Sq. They provide maintenance and aircrew support as needed.

Once the cargo reaches Cam Ranh Bay it is unloaded by cargo specialists of the 14th Aerial Port Sq., then broken down by receiving location and loaded aboard the in-country aircraft.

Here C130s, C123s and C7As, under operational control of the 834th Air Division, fly their loads to strips that range from 10,000 feet to 1,000 feet.
The C130s are usually counted as the workhorse of the fleet due to their larger load capacity and night and day capability. These crews—flying with Operation Location Alpha Charlie (OLAC) of the 315th Air Division, owners of the C130 aircraft orginate 24 sorties each day at Cam Ranh Bay.

Averaging 800 tons of cargo day, the Hercules deliver to all points in Vietnam that have runway of at least 3,000 feet. Regardless of type of runway construction, as long as it meets the minimum requirements of weight capacity the Hercules will deliver the load.

According to Lt. Col. Gordon F. Carmichael, deputy commander of OLAC, "We haul anything that we can get into an aircraft. We fly day and night to supply the ground forces".

On strips shorter than 3,000 feet and usually closer to the ground war, the Providers and Caribous are called into action. The Providers, assigned to the 315th Air Commando Wing at Tan Son Nhut, and the Caribous, assigned to the 483d Troop Carrier Wing at Cam Ranh Bay, have a limited load capability and usually fly the shorter missions.

Also contributing to the flow of war materials are surface ships of all sizes. Tying up at the natural deep water port of Cam Ranh Bay, they unload supplies which are then trucked or flown to their users.

Whether they are flying C130s or other types of cargo planes, the combat airlift pilots and crews usually fly over rough and unfamiliar territory. They are constantly in danger from Viet Cong ground fire and it is not unusual for them to land and discover bullet holes in the aircraft.

A typical mission for the day may take a C123 from Cam Ranh Bay to Pleiku, where it drops off a load of food for the use of airmen. At Pleiku he may pick up Vietnamese soldiers and their families and take them to their homes near a Special Forces camp somewhere in the central highlands of Vietnam. The crew then return to Cam Ranh Bay and take on a load of ammunition rigged to be airdropped to ground forces in a fight with the Viet Cong.

**Asia Airlift Operations Tripled Last Year**

(*Pacific Stars & Stripes, Friday, January 28, 1966*)
TACHIKAWA (01) — The increased tempo of activity on Southeast Asia in 1965 was reflected in the vast growth in airlift operations of the U.S. Air Force's 315th Air Div.

As the theater airlift arm of Pacific Air Forces, the Division responded to the challenges of its 15th year of existence by more than tripling the tonnage of cargo airlifted the previous year. Division operated and controlled aircraft flew about 48.5 million miles — equivalent to 121 round trips to the moon.

Commanded by Col. Charles W. Howe, a veteran airlift commander, the Division's missions include airlift for airborne assault, landed and airdropped supply, aeromedical evacuation, operation of air terminals and the airlift of complete military units. Division personnel and units are based in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Vietnam and Thailand.

Established during the Korean war, on Jan. 25, 1951, the division marked its busiest year in 1965.

The 287,006 tons hauled on division operated and controlled aircraft last year surpassed the highest figure for any 12-month period during the Korean war.

During the year just ended, strength of the division increased from just under 2,000 personnel and 36 units and detachments to over 2,000 persons and more than 36 units and detachments.

From an assigned airlift strength of four C-130 Hercules squadrons augmented by four Tactical Air Command (TAC) rotational squadrons, the 315th was boosted to 10 assigned C-130 squadrons with one attached TAC rotational Hercules unit. This was in addition to the previously assigned four C-123 Provider squadrons of the Vietnam-based 315th Air Commando Group augmented by a Royal Australian Air Force detachment of CV-2 aircraft, plus a squadron of C-118 Liftmasters used for aeromedical evacuation. C-121 Super Constellations and C-124 Globemasters of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) also augment the division for air evacuation and outsized cargo airlift.

In addition to the record cargo tonnage hauled in 1965, the 315th Air Division airlifted 830,677 personnel, including more than 24,500 air evacuation patients. This compares with the 1964 figures of just under 360,000 passengers of which about 7,000 were patients.
Theater aeromedical evacuation patients are cared for by flight nurses and medical technicians of the Division's 9th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron aboard 315th aircraft.

During 1965, the Division aerial port squadrons and their detachments handled 506,774 tons of cargo and more than 1.7 million passengers. In December, two new aerial port squadrons were organized in the Republic of Vietnam, bringing to five the number of such units assigned to the Division.

Of the total cargo airlifted by the 315th throughout the Pacific theater in 1965, almost three fourths of it—nearly 210,000 tons - was hauled in the Republic of Vietnam by C-123 and C-130 aircraft.

In addition to meeting scheduled and non-scheduled airlift requirements, 315th aircraft and crews participated in the mass deployments of the Army's 173d Airborne Brigade and the 3d Marine Division from Okinawa to the Republic of Vietnam. Movement of the 173d involved nearly 2,000 men and over two million pounds of equipment. More than 1,000 marines and 1.5 million pounds of gear were airlifted during the Marine move.

The 315th Air Division, quartered at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, is one of five major subcommands of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), reporting direct to PACAF headquarters.

Aircraft assigned and controlled by the Division perform airlift missions in response to priorities set by the Western Pacific Transportation Office. The WTO is a staff agency of Pacific Command, the unified command exercising overall responsibility for military activities in the Pacific. PACAF is the air component of Pacific Command.

As members of the 315th Air Division observe the organization's 15th birthday on Jan. 25, they prepare for the challenges of the Division's 16th year, which promise to be greater than ever.

**Most-Shot-at Planes Defoliate VC Lairs**

*(Pacific Stars & Stripes, Tuesday, January 11, 1966)*
By SSGT. STEWART DIAMOND

TAN SON NHUT AB, Vietnam—Four of the most-shot-at Air Force aircraft in Vietnam are fighting daily, robbing the Viet Cong of dense jungle foliage that conceals staging areas, supply depots and ambush sites.

Hedgehopping over the treetops 50 to 100 feet above the ground, men of the 309th Air Commando Sq’s Special Aerial Spray Flight, better known as Ranch Hand, defoliate the Viet Cong hiding places with an aerial spray.

The C-123 Providers used by Ranch Hand to carry out their mission have taken many direct hits from rifle and automatic weapons.

"Leper Colony" is the most-hit aircraft, with 212 hits and six Purple Hearts awarded to crew members. "Patches" has received 165 hits and four Purple Hearts. "Miss Susan" has collected 172 hits and two Purple Hearts, followed by "Little Devil" with 112 hits and one Purple Heart.

Each hit, after it is repaired by sheet metal workers and the aircraft maintenance section here, is painted red. On the nose of the aircraft, a bull's-eye is painted to give the Viet Cong something to shoot at, according to a maintenance sergeant.

For each crewman wounded on a Ranch Hand flight, a Purple Heart is painted on the left side of the fuselage. The men note happily that no one has been killed.

Spray missions are usually carried out by three C-123s, flying in formation over heavily wooded terrain. The Providers are escorted by strike aircraft for protection, but at low-level altitude? Ranch Hand still takes a lot of fire.

The spray aircraft have special armor plating, including an armored steel box for the crew chief who controls the spray. Still, the main danger lies in ricocheting bullets.

Ranch Hands, from crew chiefs to pilots, are all volunteers. The pilots come from the 309th Air Commando Sq. and are seasoned veterans of the war in the Republic of Vietnam.
Silver Star presented to Colonel Nolen

(The Port Arthur News, Wednesday, August 28, 1971)

WITH U. S. COMBAT AIR FORCES. Vietnam — Colonel Cregg P. Nolen Jr. of Port Arthur, has received the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit and the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) for his achievements as an F-100 Super Sabre pilot and tactical fighter wing commander in Vietnam.

Col. Nolen, whose wife, Roberta is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. S. J. Rodigue, 2930 12th street, Port Arthur, was presented the decorations recently at Phan Rang AB. Vietnam, by Gen. Lucius D. Clay Jr., Pacific Air Forces commander.

The colonel earned the Silver Star for gallantry near Tchepone, Laos, when he led his flight of two fighter-bombers against a North Vietnamese tank element closing on a defenseless contingency of 1,300 allied personnel. Despite heavy antiaircraft fire, he repeatedly made low-altitude attacks, destroying the last of the tanks and saving the lives of many allied soldiers.

Col. Nolen

The flying commander—a veteran of World War II and the Korean War—was awarded the DFC for extraordinary aerial achievement on a mission supporting ground troops under heavy attack during the closing days of a major allied offensive. The enemy abandoned its attack in the face of his accurate, low-level weapons deliveries.

Nolen received the Legion of Merit for exceptionally outstanding service to the United States as vice-commander and then commander of Phan Rang’s 35th Tactical Fighter Wing now undergoing deactivation.

A graduate of Port Arthur’s Thomas Jefferson high school, Nolen entered the military service in 1942, was commissioned in 1944 through the aviation cadet program, and now holds the aeronautical rating of command pilot. He has a bachelors degree in economics from the University of Nebraska at Omaha and a master’s degree in foreign affairs from George Washington university.

Col. and Mrs. Nolen have two daughters, Mrs. Christine James and Mrs. Betty Knight and two sons, Cregg P. III and Michael.
PRESTON A. ROMERO Preston A. Romero, son of Mr. and Mrs. Jerry J. Romero of 3520 36th street, has been promoted to the rank of Air Force sergeant while serving as security policeman at Phan Rang Air Force base in Vietnam. Sgt. Romero is a graduate of Thomas Jefferson high school. He is married and has been in Vietnam seven months.

DAVID FONTENOT U.S. Air Forces Vietnam. U.S. Air Force Sgt. David S. Fontenot, son of Mr. and Mrs. Sidney J. Fontenot of 3815 Beech Ave., Port Arthur, is on duty at Phan Rang AB, Vietnam. Fontenot, a radio repairman is assigned to a unit of the Air Force Communications Service. Before his arrival in Vietnam he served at Goodfellow AFB, Texas. The sergeant is a 1966 graduate of Port Neches-Groves high school. His wife, Pamela is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Homer Lide, 3008 Pearl St. Groves, Texas. *(The Port Arthur News, Wednesday, April 28, 1971)*

CREGG P. NOLAN JR. WITH U. S, COMBAT AIR FORCES, Vietnam — Col. Cregg P. Nolen Jr., whose wife, Roberta, is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. S. J. Rodigue, 2930 12th street, Port Arthur, has received the U. S. Air Force Meritorious Service Medal at Phan Rang AB, Vietnam. Col. Nolen was decorated for his contributions to the combat capability of the U. S. Air Force while assigned at the Pentagon as an air staff officer. He is now at Phan Rang as vice commander, 35th Tactical Fighter Wing, a unit of the Pacific Air Forces. The colonel, who holds the aeronautical rating of command pilot, is a veteran of World War II and the Korean War. He was commissioned in 1944 through the aviation cadet program. Col. Nolen, a 1943 graduate of Thomas Jefferson high school, received his bachelor of general education degree in 1964 from the University of Nebraska at Omaha and his M.S. degree in foreign affairs in 1966 from George Washington University in Washington, D. C. *(The Port Arthur News, Thursday, February 4, 1971)*

MARION P. DANNA U.S. Air Force SSgt Marion P. Danna, son of Mr. and MRs. C. F. Danna,
7915 Spurlock road, Beaumont, is on duty at Phan Rang AB, Vietnam. Danna, a flight engineer, is assigned to a unit of the Pacific Air Forces. The sergeant has previously served 18 months in Vietnam and 36 months in the Republic of Korea. Before arriving at Phan Rang he was assigned at Lockbourne AFB, Ohio. Danna is a 1949 graduate of Beaumont high school. His wife is the former Shirley A. Henderson. *(The Port Arthur News, Friday, December 4, 1970)*

Authors in Our Midst *(If anyone knows of any other authors from our group please let me know and I will add them.)*

Bob Howe:  *Dreadful Lady Over the Mekong Delta, An Analysis of RAAF Canberra Operations in the Vietnam War*

Richard L. Dixon:  *Fighting Fighting*

Jack Anderson:  *Vietnam Remembrances*

Joe Kaupa:  *Protect and Serve: One Man’s Journey from Vietnam to Law Enforcement*

Robert Chappelear:  *Tales of Bien Hoa* and *Tales of Phan Rang*

Margorie Hanson:  *Brave Warriors, Humble Heroes: A Vietnam War Story*

Vic Markle:  *Forgotten Moments Forgotten People*

Mike Trahan:  *The Gift: The Air Force Years*;  *The Gift Part Two - The Air Force Years*;  and  *Home Again: Short Story*

Rob Morris:  *Untold Valor*;  *Marinell; The Wild Blue Yonder and Beyond: The 95th Bomb Group in War and Peace*;  *Prisoner of the Swiss*;  *I'll Be Seeing You* and  *Combat Bombardier: Memoirs of Two Combat Tour in the Skies Over Europe in World War Two*

Carl Adams:  *Remember the Alamo: A Sentry Dog Handler’s View of Vietnam from the Perimeter of Phan Rang Air Base*

Gary K. Thrasher:  *Phantom Letters*
I really appreciate all of the stories that these authors have allowed me to share with you and I hope that you do as well. Some will transport you back to those days when the air smelled of damp canvas and all you looked forward to was when you could get back to the ‘real word’ on that “freedom bird”. Some will actually make you cry and many of them you will bring a smile to your face, but all of them are the authors attempt to tell us what it was like to serve in Vietnam and what they experienced. This list, of course, only contains those that have published works. We have many authors like Larry Theurer and Mario Campanaro who have very eloquently layed down the words that tell of their Vietnam experiences. I also would like to call attention to the book by Bob Howe, which is a consummate history of Number 2 Squadron in Vietnam. It is now for sale and I know many of you would like to get your hands on a copy. I’ve already loaned my copy out several times, but since the book is now for sale I will just hold on to mine and treasure it. Thanks Bob for the gift of your work that must have taken years to write. Here again is the link to the Dreadful Lady over the Mekog Delta.

PHAN RANG STAFF MEMBERS

Robert Kellington & Joseph Burkhart: Master of Ceremonies
Jack Anderson: Treasurer
Lou Ruggerio: Site coordinator/Contract negotiator
Douglas Severt: Reunion Coordinator
Ed Downey/Barbara Brandt: Ceremonies
Christopher Boles: Photographer
Kirk Minert: Aircraft Historian
Bob Tucker: Keeper of the Rolls
Joe Kaupa: In Memoriam
Bruce Muller: Badge Board
Jim Erixson & Mike Maleski: Chaplain
Bob Howe: Australian Ambassador
Here are the costs for the Seattle Reunion 2017:

Reunion Fee: $10.00/person
Plate Banquet Dinner: $50.00/person
Beef Banquet Dinner: $55.00/person
Trip to Museum of Flight: $50.00/person

You can send your checks at any time from now until September 20th. Send them and make them payable to:

Happy Valley Reunion
826 72nd St SE
Auburn, Wa 98092

See you in Seattle! October 11th thru the 15th

Here’s the latest from the Pacific Northwest

Seattle 2017 is only 4 months away! We have only 15 rooms left on our allotment, so don't delay! We may be able to add rooms, but not at the last minute. Get the $109/night price now!

Use this link for hotel reservations. Don't call! Use the link.
http://doubletree.hilton.com/.../SEASPDT-PHA-2017.../index.jhtml

One thing most visitors to Seattle want to see is the Pike Place Market. To get there from the hotel, take the free shuttle to the Tukwila Light Rail Station. From there it's a $6 day pass fare to downtown Seattle. Go to the surface and walk 5 easy blocks to the market. It's an amazing place!

You can also take an elevator from the Market down to the heart of the Seattle waterfront.

See you in four months! Remember the Banquet is on Sunday, October 15th. Come earlier in the week to see Seattle at its finest!

Here are some important dates:
Wednesday, October 11th: The Hospitality Room will open.
Friday, October 13th: Trip to Boeing’s Museum of Flight.
Sunday, October 15th. 4:00 PM. Annual Business Meeting. We'll decide which East Coast City we go to in 2018.
Sunday, October 15th: 5:00ish. Group picture.
I would encourage anybody who's planning on attending to reserve your room **NOW**! That will lock-in the $109/night rate.

**PHAN RANG REUNION SHIRTS**

Shirts along with Phan Rang AB hats and Phan Rang AB license plate frames are available [here](#).  

*Note: On the T-Shirt graphics both the front and back are displayed.*

**Doug’s Comments**

I hope that you enjoyed this issue of the Phan Rang Newsletter. When I sent out the previous newsletter I had at least 30 returns, so I deleted those addresses from my address book so if you are reading this and did not receive it in your email, please send me a corrected email address. I’m still looking for Area Ambassadors, so if you would like to be a volunteer for your state please let me know. I was also thinking about Bob Tucker, “Keeper of the Rolls”, and was wondering if we would want to expand that duty to include contact information like address, telephone number and email? It probably would have to be separate from the “Roll Call” because most people probably wouldn’t want to put that type of information out to the world, but Bob could maintain that data base and anyone looking for another phan ranger could contact Bob. Between myself, Jack Anderson and Bruce Muller we probably have a pretty comprehensive list...Bob could just combine them into on. What does anyone else think of that idea? We could create another position titled “Phan Rang AB Locator”. This newsletter was compiled and published by Douglas Severt. Previous issues of the Phan Rang Newsletter are available [here](#) for download.